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he desire-satisfaction theory of welfare says that what is basically good 
for a subject – what benefits him in the most fundamental, non-
derivative way – is the satisfaction of his desires. One challenge to this 
view is the existence of quirky desires, such as a desire to count blades of 
grass, or to turn on every radio that is turned off.1 It is hard to see why any-
one would desire such things, and thus hard to believe that the satisfaction of 
such desires could be basically good for anyone. This suggests that only some 
desires are basically good when satisfied, and that desire satisfactionists owe 
us an account of which desires these are, and why. 
In a recent paper in this journal, Donald Bruckner proposes such an ac-
count.2 On his view, a desire is welfare-relevant (i.e., such that its satisfaction 
would be basically good for its subject) if and only if and because its subject 
could describe its object in a way that makes it comprehensible what about 
the object attracts him or appeals to him. We are inclined to view quirky de-
sires as welfare-irrelevant because we assume that their objects cannot be de-
scribed in such a way. But if there were a quirky desire whose object could be 
so described by the subject whose desire it is, then this desire would be rele-
vant to that subject’s welfare. 
I will argue that while Bruckner’s view delivers plausible verdicts about 
the cases to which it is meant to apply, its account of what makes a desire wel-
fare-relevant is unmotivated and implausible. Desire satisfactionists can re-
tain what is plausible about his view while endorsing a better explanation of 
why welfare-relevant desires have that status if they accept the following ac-
count instead: a desire is welfare-relevant if and only if and because some-
thing about its object attracts, or appeals to, the subject who has the desire. 
 
1. Bruckner’s Account 
 
Let me begin by stating Bruckner’s account in greater detail. Bruckner writes 
that for any subject, S, who has a desire, D, whose object is p, the satisfaction 
of D would be basically good for S if and only if and because S could, if 
called upon, describe p “in such a way that makes it comprehensible to others 
what S sees in p as positive, worthy of pursuit.”3 This language might suggest 
that the relevant description must make comprehensible which of p’s proper-
ties S believes to be good (or to warrant pro-attitudes toward p), but Bruckner 
does not have anything so intellectualized or evaluative in mind. Elsewhere, 
                                                
1 Rawls (1971: 434); Quinn (1993: 32). 
2 Bruckner (2016). 
3 Ibid.: 5. 
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he says that the relevant sort of description is one that “makes it clear to us 
what appeals to S” about p.4 He also writes that the right kind of description 
explains S’s “attraction” to p and “supports the claim that there is something 
positive for the agent in it.”5 It is evident, then, that the relevant sort of de-
scription is merely one that makes it comprehensible what it is about the ob-
ject of the desire that attracts, or appeals to, S. 
Comprehensibility, in the sense at issue here, is a very minimal require-
ment. You can render your desire to listen to heavy metal comprehensible 
simply by saying that you enjoy it, even if you cannot identify any specific 
aspect of the music that gives you pleasure. Likewise, you can make your de-
sire to eat chocolate ice cream comprehensible simply by saying that you like 
it.6 A desire can be comprehensible even if its object does not warrant desire 
and is not objectively good.7 Moreover, it turns out that we need not ask 
which “others” a desire must be made comprehensible to: there is “a stand-
ard for comprehensibility independent of being comprehended,” and there 
are objective facts about what is comprehensible tout court.8 
The comprehensibility requirement is not trivial, however. You can de-
sire something – in the sense of being motivated to bring it about – without 
being able to describe it in the relevant way. After all, you can find yourself 
with a behavioral compulsion to do something that does not appeal to you 
(e.g., turning on radios), and it is impossible to make comprehensible what 
appeals to you about something that does not appeal to you. Besides, a sub-
ject might lack the capacities that he needs to describe what appeals to him 
about the things that appeal to him: none of a newborn’s desires can meet 
the comprehensibility requirement, since a newborn cannot describe any-
thing. 
With the foregoing clarifications in mind, we can state Bruckner’s view 
as follows: 
 
Bruckner’s Account:  A desire, D, whose object is p is welfare-
relevant if and only if and because the subject 
who has D could, if called upon, give a de-
scription of p that makes it comprehensible 
what it is about p that attracts him or appeals 
to him.9 
                                                
4 Ibid.: 6. 
5 Ibid.: 7, 6. 
6 Ibid.: 16-17. 
7 Ibid.: 25-26. 
8 Ibid.: 26-27. 
9 Bruckner usually leaves the explanatory aspect of his view implicit, but he writes on p. 25 
that “what makes something valuable on my view is that it is desired and the desirer can ren-
der the object of desire comprehensible.” 
You might worry that this view is too permissive, since it does not exclude immoral, ill-
informed or irrational desires. But, as Bruckner notes, Heathwood (2005) has convincingly 
argued that such desires can be welfare-relevant. Even if you disagree, however, you can 
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The desire-satisfaction theory claims that the satisfaction of a subject’s wel-
fare-relevant desires is the only thing that is basically good for him. Thus, 
according to the version of this theory that accepts Bruckner’s account, the 
only thing that is basically good for a subject is the satisfaction of those of his 
desires whose objects he could describe in a way that makes it comprehensi-
ble what attracts him or appeals to him about them. On this view, which we 
can call Brucknerian Desire Satisfactionism (BDS), quirky desires are not in 
general welfare-irrelevant: a desire to count blades of grass could be relevant, 
as long as you could give the right kind of description of its object (e.g., “It’s 
soothing, like walking on the beach”).10 But if you could not give such a de-
scription for one of your desires, then its satisfaction would not be basically 
good for you, whether it is quirky or not. 
 
2. Attraction and Description 
 
I will now argue that there is a simpler view that is extensionally equivalent to 
Bruckner’s Account when it comes to the cases to which that account is in-
tended to apply (and about which it delivers plausible results): those involv-
ing normal human adults. Desire satisfactionists should prefer this view to 
Bruckner’s Account because it provides a simpler and more plausible expla-
nation of why welfare-relevant desires have that status. 
As Bruckner admits, BDS is not a plausible theory of the welfare of sub-
jects who, whether because of infancy or cognitive impairment, lack the ca-
pacity to describe the things that appeal to them in a way that makes it com-
prehensible what appeals to them about those things. For if BDS were ap-
plied to such subjects, it would falsely imply that nothing is basically good for 
them and that none of them is positive in welfare. Bruckner merely claims 
that his view is true of normal human adults – those who possess that capaci-
ty.11 His view is attractive because it has plausible implications about them. 
Our judgment that the grass-counter does not benefit from the satisfaction 
of his desire seems to depend on the assumption that he could not describe 
the object of his desire in a way that makes it comprehensible what appeals 
to him about it. When we imagine that he could so describe it (e.g., by ex-
plaining that he finds it relaxing), this judgment no longer seems warranted. 
Thus, at least when it comes to normal human adults, it is plausible that a 
                                                                                                                     
accept my criticism of Bruckner – though you will need to make appropriate modifications 
to the view that I will propose. 
10 Bruckner (2016: 8). 
11 Ibid.: 14-15. I believe that arguments of the sort that I present in Lin (forthcoming) create 
problems for Bruckner’s view even when it is restricted to normal human adults. (Bruckner 
briefly discusses this possibility (15, n. 17), but it seems to me that he does not give it its 
due.) Moreover, I believe that the simpler view that I propose below is not threatened by 
such arguments. If this is correct, then we have further reason to prefer this view to Bruck-
ner’s. Unfortunately, I lack the space to defend these claims here. 
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desire is welfare-relevant if and only if its subject can describe its object in 
the way that Bruckner’s view requires.  
This biconditional does not entail Bruckner’s view, however, since it is 
neutral on the question of what explains why the desires that are relevant to 
someone’s welfare have that status. Bruckner claims that what makes a desire 
relevant to the welfare of the (normal adult) subject who possesses it is the 
fact that the subject could describe its object in the right way. But the afore-
mentioned biconditional is also accommodated by the following view, which 
provides an alternative explanation: 
 
The Attraction View: A desire, D, whose object is p is welfare-
 relevant if and only if and because something 
 about p attracts, or appeals to, the subject who 
 has D.12 
 
This view is extensionally equivalent to Bruckner’s Account when it comes to 
normal human adults. If a normal human adult who desires p can describe it 
in a way that makes it comprehensible what appeals to him about it, then ob-
viously, something about p appeals to him. And if such an adult desires p but 
cannot give such a description of it, then nothing about p appeals to him. 
After all, a normal human adult is one who has the capacity to describe the 
things that appeal to him in a way that makes it comprehensible what appeals 
to him about them. If such an adult desires p but cannot describe p in the 
relevant way, this cannot be because he lacks that capacity. By hypothesis, if 
there were anything about p that attracted him, he would be able to describe 
p in a way that made this comprehensible. So his inability to describe p in the 
right way can only be due to the fact that nothing about p attracts him or ap-
peals to him. Thus, if a normal human adult desires p, he could describe p in 
a way that makes it comprehensible what attracts or appeals to him about it if 
and only if something about it attracts or appeals to him.  
Because the Attraction View is extensionally equivalent to Bruckner’s 
Account in the cases to which that account is intended to apply (viz., those 
involving normal human adults), it is as well supported by those cases as that 
account is. Earlier, I mentioned that when it comes to normal human adults, 
the following claim is plausible: a desire is welfare-relevant if and only if its 
subject can describe its object in the way that Bruckner’s view requires. But 
in light of what I have just argued, that claim is equivalent to the following 
implication of the Attraction View: a desire is welfare-relevant if and only if 
something about its object attracts, or appeals to, its subject. Our intuitions 
about the conditions under which the desires of normal adults are welfare-
relevant give equal support to both views. 
What the Attraction View and Bruckner’s Account disagree about is ex-
planation. On the former, what makes some desires relevant to our welfare is 
                                                
12 Heathwood (unpublished manuscript) defends a similar view.  
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just the fact that their objects attract us. On the latter, this is only half of the 
explanation – the other half being that we can describe their objects in a way 
that makes it comprehensible what attracts us to them. But I see no reason to 
suppose that the latter fact enters into the explanation. If a normal human 
adult desires to count blades of grass but cannot describe the object of this 
desire in the relevant way, that can only be because nothing about that object 
attracts him. It is the latter fact, not the former, that explains why his desire is 
not welfare-relevant. If, on the other hand, he can give a description of the 
right kind, then something about the object does attract him, and this suf-
fices to explain why his desire is welfare-relevant. Whether he could describe 
the object of his desire in the relevant way merely plays an evidential role: it 
tracks the presence or absence of features of the object that appeal to him. 
From an explanatory point of view, it is a spare wheel. 
To summarize: the Attraction View gets the same plausible results that 
Bruckner’s Account does in the cases to which that account is intended to 
apply, but it provides a simpler and more plausible explanation of why the 
desires that are welfare-relevant have that status. It has all the strengths of 
Bruckner’s Account while also having an explanatory advantage over it. 
Thus, desire satisfactionists should prefer it over Bruckner’s Account.  
 
3. Objections and Replies13 
 
One might wonder whether Bruckner’s Account and the Attraction View 
really are extensionally equivalent when it comes to normal human adults. 
Could there not be cases in which a normal adult desires something that ap-
peals to him but cannot describe precisely what about it appeals to him? If so, 
then perhaps the verdicts about such cases that Bruckner’s Account delivers 
are different from, and more plausible than, those delivered by the Attraction 
View. 
Clearly, there are such cases. As Bruckner writes, you could desire, and 
be attracted to, heavy metal music without being able to identify any “specific 
feature” of it that attracts you. You could desire, and be attracted to, choco-
late ice cream without being able to describe precisely what about its flavor 
or texture appeals to you. But as I mentioned earlier, Bruckner claims that 
these are cases in which you can meet the comprehensibility requirement 
simply by saying that the object of your desire gives you pleasure.14 Although 
it is not trivial, the comprehensibility requirement really is quite minimal. 
Cases like the ones just described are not ones about which the two views 
disagree, since they are not ones in which Bruckner’s Account deems the de-
sires welfare-irrelevant. Indeed, Bruckner has confirmed that a normal hu-
man adult can describe the object of one of his desires in the right way if and 
only if something about that object attracts or appeals to him, and thus that 
                                                
13 I thank Jason Raibley for raising the following objections. 
14 Bruckner (2016: 16-17). 
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his account is extensionally equivalent to the Attraction View when it comes 
to normal human adults.15 
Of course, we can imagine a variant on Bruckner’s Account on which 
desires are welfare-irrelevant if their subjects cannot articulate exactly what it 
is about their objects that attracts them. This variant obviously would deem 
fewer desires welfare-relevant than the Attraction View does, but it would be 
implausible for precisely this reason. Surely, your desires for chocolate ice 
cream and heavy metal are not irrelevant to your welfare simply on the 
grounds that you cannot articulate exactly what it is about these objects that 
attracts you. 
One might wonder whether the aforementioned variant on Bruckner’s 
Account is better than the Attraction View at handling the sorts of desire 
that motivated Bruckner in the first place: quirky desires. If it has more plau-
sible implications than the Attraction View does about the circumstances in 
which quirky desires are welfare-relevant, that would be some reason to pre-
fer it – a reason that would have to be weighed against the fact that it has 
implausible implications about ordinary desires, such as the desire to eat 
chocolate ice cream. 
I do not think that the variant on Bruckner’s Account does any better 
with quirky desires than the Attraction View does, however. It seems to me 
that our conviction that quirky desires are welfare-irrelevant depends precise-
ly on the assumption that they are mere motivations to realize states of af-
fairs that do not appeal to their subjects. We are incredulous at the idea that 
it could be basically good for someone to satisfy a desire to count blades of 
grass precisely because we find it difficult to believe that anyone could really 
be attracted to doing this. Once we stipulate that we are imagining someone 
who is genuinely attracted to this activity, it is no longer implausible that he 
would benefit from performing it – at least if we assume that some form of 
desire satisfactionism is true. Thus, it seems that the Attraction View says the 
right thing about quirky desires. By contrast, the variant on Bruckner’s Ac-
count would wrongly deem some quirky desires to be welfare-irrelevant. 
But suppose that, contrary to what I have just argued, the variant is bet-
ter at handling quirky desires. Even so, I doubt that this advantage could 
come close to outweighing the fact that the variant has implausible implica-
tions about ordinary desires (e.g., that your desire for chocolate ice cream is 
not relevant to your welfare because you cannot describe precisely what 
about its object appeals to you). The Attraction View would remain the bet-
ter view on the whole, and it would also remain superior to the original ver-
sion of Bruckner’s Account. 
 
  
                                                
15 Personal communication. 
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4. Conclusion 
 
If desire satisfactionism is correct, then I agree with Bruckner that quirky de-
sires can, in principle, be welfare-relevant. Moreover, I find the following 
implication of his view plausible: when it comes to normal human adults, the 
welfare-relevant desires are exactly the ones whose objects have some feature 
that attracts, or appeals to, the subjects who have those desires. But I submit 
that what best explains this is not Bruckner’s Account, but the Attraction 
View: what makes a desire relevant to a subject’s welfare is the fact that some 
feature of its object attracts that subject. By endorsing the Attraction View, 
desire satisfactionists can retain the virtues of Bruckner’s Account while 
availing themselves of a better explanation of why welfare-relevant desires 
have that status.16 
 
Eden Lin 
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16 I thank Donald Bruckner, Richard Yetter Chappell, Chris Heathwood, Anthony Kelley, 
Barry Maguire and Jason Raibley. 
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